Configuration — tools and custom providers
tools.* config keys and custom provider / base-URL setup. For agents, channels, and other top-level config keys, see Configuration reference.
Tools
Tool profiles
tools.profile sets a base allowlist before tools.allow/tools.deny:
| Profile | Includes |
|---|---|
minimal | session_status only |
coding | group:fs, group:runtime, group:web, group:sessions, group:memory, cron, image, image_generate, video_generate |
messaging | group:messaging, sessions_list, sessions_history, sessions_send, session_status |
full | No restriction (same as unset) |
Tool groups
| Group | Tools |
|---|---|
group:runtime | exec, process, code_execution (bash is accepted as an alias for exec) |
group:fs | read, write, edit, apply_patch |
group:sessions | sessions_list, sessions_history, sessions_send, sessions_spawn, sessions_yield, subagents, session_status |
group:memory | memory_search, memory_get |
group:web | web_search, x_search, web_fetch |
group:ui | browser, canvas |
group:automation | heartbeat_respond, cron, gateway |
group:messaging | message |
group:nodes | nodes |
group:agents | agents_list, update_plan |
group:media | image, image_generate, music_generate, video_generate, tts |
group:openclaw | All built-in tools (excludes provider plugins) |
group:plugins | Tools owned by loaded plugins, including configured MCP servers exposed through bundle-mcp |
MCP and plugin tools inside sandbox tool policy
Configured MCP servers are exposed as plugin-owned tools under the bundle-mcp plugin id. Normal tool profiles can allow them, but tools.sandbox.tools is an additional gate for sandboxed sessions. If sandbox mode is "all" or "non-main", include one of these entries in the sandbox tool allowlist when MCP/plugin tools should be visible:
bundle-mcpfor OpenClaw-managed MCP servers frommcp.servers- the plugin id for a specific native plugin
group:pluginsfor all loaded plugin-owned tools- exact MCP server tool names or server globs such as
outlook__send_mailoroutlook__*when you only want one server
Server globs use the provider-safe MCP server prefix, not necessarily the raw mcp.servers key. Non-[A-Za-z0-9_-] characters become -, names that do not start with a letter get an mcp- prefix, and long or duplicate prefixes may be truncated or suffixed; for example, mcp.servers["Outlook Graph"] uses a glob like outlook-graph__*.
{ agents: { defaults: { sandbox: { mode: "all" } } }, mcp: { servers: { outlook: { command: "node", args: ["./outlook-mcp.js"] }, }, }, tools: { sandbox: { tools: { alsoAllow: ["web_search", "web_fetch", "memory_search", "memory_get", "bundle-mcp"], }, }, },}Without that sandbox-layer entry, the MCP server can still load successfully while its tools are filtered before the provider request. Use openclaw doctor to catch this shape for OpenClaw-managed servers in mcp.servers. MCP servers loaded from bundled plugin manifests or Claude .mcp.json use the same sandbox gate, but this diagnostic does not enumerate those sources yet; use the same allowlist entries if their tools disappear in sandboxed turns.
tools.allow / tools.deny
Global tool allow/deny policy (deny wins). Case-insensitive, supports * wildcards. Applied even when Docker sandbox is off.
{ tools: { deny: ["browser", "canvas"] },}write and apply_patch are separate tool ids. allow: ["write"] also enables apply_patch for compatible models, but deny: ["write"] does not deny apply_patch. To block all file mutation, deny group:fs or list each mutating tool explicitly:
{ tools: { deny: ["write", "edit", "apply_patch"] },}tools.byProvider
Further restrict tools for specific providers or models. Order: base profile → provider profile → allow/deny.
{ tools: { profile: "coding", byProvider: { "google-antigravity": { profile: "minimal" }, "openai/gpt-5.4": { allow: ["group:fs", "sessions_list"] }, }, },}tools.toolsBySender
Restricts tools for a specific requester identity. This is defense-in-depth on top of channel access control; sender values must come from the channel adapter, not message text.
{ tools: { toolsBySender: { "channel:discord:1234567890123": { alsoAllow: ["group:fs"] }, "id:guest-user-id": { deny: ["group:runtime", "group:fs"] }, "*": { deny: ["exec", "process", "write", "edit", "apply_patch"] }, }, },}Keys use explicit prefixes: channel:<channelId>:<senderId>, id:<senderId>, e164:<phone>, username:<handle>, name:<displayName>, or "*". Channel ids are canonical OpenClaw ids; aliases such as teams normalize to msteams. Legacy unprefixed keys are accepted as id: only. Matching order is channel+id, id, e164, username, name, then wildcard.
Per-agent agents.list[].tools.toolsBySender overrides the global sender match when it matches, even with an empty {} policy.
tools.elevated
Controls elevated exec access outside the sandbox:
{ tools: { elevated: { enabled: true, allowFrom: { whatsapp: ["+15555550123"], discord: ["1234567890123", "987654321098765432"], }, }, },}- Per-agent override (
agents.list[].tools.elevated) can only further restrict. /elevated on|off|ask|fullstores state per session; inline directives apply to single message.- Elevated
execbypasses sandboxing and uses the configured escape path (gatewayby default, ornodewhen the exec target isnode).
tools.exec
{ tools: { exec: { backgroundMs: 10000, timeoutSec: 1800, cleanupMs: 1800000, notifyOnExit: true, notifyOnExitEmptySuccess: false, commandHighlighting: false, applyPatch: { enabled: false, allowModels: ["gpt-5.5"], }, }, },}tools.loopDetection
Tool-loop safety checks are disabled by default. Set enabled: true to activate detection. Settings can be defined globally in tools.loopDetection and overridden per-agent at agents.list[].tools.loopDetection.
{ tools: { loopDetection: { enabled: true, historySize: 30, warningThreshold: 10, criticalThreshold: 20, globalCircuitBreakerThreshold: 30, detectors: { genericRepeat: true, knownPollNoProgress: true, pingPong: true, }, }, },}tools.web
{ tools: { web: { search: { enabled: true, apiKey: "brave_api_key", // or BRAVE_API_KEY env maxResults: 5, timeoutSeconds: 30, cacheTtlMinutes: 15, }, fetch: { enabled: true, provider: "firecrawl", // optional; omit for auto-detect maxChars: 50000, maxCharsCap: 50000, maxResponseBytes: 2000000, timeoutSeconds: 30, cacheTtlMinutes: 15, maxRedirects: 3, readability: true, userAgent: "custom-ua", }, }, },}tools.media
Configures inbound media understanding (image/audio/video):
{ tools: { media: { concurrency: 2, asyncCompletion: { directSend: false, // deprecated: completions stay agent-mediated }, audio: { enabled: true, maxBytes: 20971520, scope: { default: "deny", rules: [{ action: "allow", match: { chatType: "direct" } }], }, models: [ { provider: "openai", model: "gpt-4o-mini-transcribe" }, { type: "cli", command: "whisper", args: ["--model", "base", "{{MediaPath}}"] }, ], }, image: { enabled: true, timeoutSeconds: 180, models: [{ provider: "ollama", model: "gemma4:26b", timeoutSeconds: 300 }], }, video: { enabled: true, maxBytes: 52428800, models: [{ provider: "google", model: "gemini-3-flash-preview" }], }, }, },}- `provider`: API provider id (`openai`, `anthropic`, `google`/`gemini`, `groq`, etc.)- `model`: model id override- `profile` / `preferredProfile`: `auth-profiles.json` profile selection
**CLI entry** (`type: "cli"`):
- `command`: executable to run- `args`: templated args (supports `{{MediaPath}}`, `{{Prompt}}`, `{{MaxChars}}`, etc.; `openclaw doctor --fix` migrates deprecated `{input}` placeholders to `{{MediaPath}}`)
**Common fields:**
- `capabilities`: optional list (`image`, `audio`, `video`). Defaults: `openai`/`anthropic`/`minimax` → image, `google` → image+audio+video, `groq` → audio.- `prompt`, `maxChars`, `maxBytes`, `timeoutSeconds`, `language`: per-entry overrides.- `tools.media.image.timeoutSeconds` and matching image model `timeoutSeconds` entries also apply when the agent calls the explicit `image` tool.- Failures fall back to the next entry.
Provider auth follows standard order: `auth-profiles.json` → env vars → `models.providers.*.apiKey`.
**Async completion fields:**
- `asyncCompletion.directSend`: deprecated compatibility flag. Completed async media tasks stay requester-session mediated so the agent receives the result, decides how to tell the user, and uses the message tool when source delivery requires it.tools.agentToAgent
{ tools: { agentToAgent: { enabled: false, allow: ["home", "work"], }, },}tools.sessions
Controls which sessions can be targeted by the session tools (sessions_list, sessions_history, sessions_send).
Default: tree (current session + sessions spawned by it, such as subagents).
{ tools: { sessions: { // "self" | "tree" | "agent" | "all" visibility: "tree", }, },}tools.sessions_spawn
Controls inline attachment support for sessions_spawn.
{ tools: { sessions_spawn: { attachments: { enabled: false, // opt-in: set true to allow inline file attachments maxTotalBytes: 5242880, // 5 MB total across all files maxFiles: 50, maxFileBytes: 1048576, // 1 MB per file retainOnSessionKeep: false, // keep attachments when cleanup="keep" }, }, },}tools.experimental
Experimental built-in tool flags. Default off unless a strict-agentic GPT-5 auto-enable rule applies.
{ tools: { experimental: { planTool: true, // enable experimental update_plan }, },}planTool: enables the structuredupdate_plantool for non-trivial multi-step work tracking.- Default:
falseunlessagents.defaults.embeddedAgent.executionContract(or a per-agent override) is set to"strict-agentic"for an OpenAI or OpenAI Codex GPT-5-family run. Settrueto force the tool on outside that scope, orfalseto keep it off even for strict-agentic GPT-5 runs. - When enabled, the system prompt also adds usage guidance so the model only uses it for substantial work and keeps at most one step
in_progress.
agents.defaults.subagents
{ agents: { defaults: { subagents: { allowAgents: ["research"], model: "minimax/MiniMax-M2.7", maxConcurrent: 8, runTimeoutSeconds: 900, announceTimeoutMs: 120000, archiveAfterMinutes: 60, }, }, },}model: default model for spawned sub-agents. If omitted, sub-agents inherit the caller’s model.allowAgents: default allowlist of configured target agent ids forsessions_spawnwhen the requester agent does not set its ownsubagents.allowAgents(["*"]= any configured target; default: same agent only). Stale entries whose agent config was deleted are rejected bysessions_spawnand omitted fromagents_list; runopenclaw doctor --fixto clean them up.runTimeoutSeconds: default timeout (seconds) forsessions_spawnwhen the tool call omitsrunTimeoutSeconds.0means no timeout.announceTimeoutMs: per-call timeout (milliseconds) for gatewayagentannounce delivery attempts. Default:120000. Transient retries can make the total announce wait longer than one configured timeout.- Per-subagent tool policy:
tools.subagents.tools.allow/tools.subagents.tools.deny.
Custom providers and base URLs
Provider plugins publish their own model catalog rows. Add custom providers via models.providers in config or ~/.openclaw/agents/<agentId>/agent/models.json.
Configuring a custom/local provider baseUrl is also the narrow network trust decision for model HTTP requests: OpenClaw allows that exact scheme://host:port origin through the guarded fetch path, without adding a separate config option or trusting other private origins.
{ models: { mode: "merge", // merge (default) | replace providers: { "custom-proxy": { baseUrl: "http://localhost:4000/v1", apiKey: "LITELLM_KEY", api: "openai-completions", // openai-completions | openai-responses | anthropic-messages | google-generative-ai models: [ { id: "llama-3.1-8b", name: "Llama 3.1 8B", reasoning: false, input: ["text"], cost: { input: 0, output: 0, cacheRead: 0, cacheWrite: 0 }, contextWindow: 128000, contextTokens: 96000, maxTokens: 32000, }, ], }, }, },}Provider field details
- `request.headers`: extra headers (merged with provider defaults). Values accept SecretRef.- `request.auth`: auth strategy override. Modes: `"provider-default"` (use provider's built-in auth), `"authorization-bearer"` (with `token`), `"header"` (with `headerName`, `value`, optional `prefix`).- `request.proxy`: HTTP proxy override. Modes: `"env-proxy"` (use `HTTP_PROXY`/`HTTPS_PROXY` env vars), `"explicit-proxy"` (with `url`). Both modes accept an optional `tls` sub-object.- `request.tls`: TLS override for direct connections. Fields: `ca`, `cert`, `key`, `passphrase` (all accept SecretRef), `serverName`, `insecureSkipVerify`.- `request.allowPrivateNetwork`: when `true`, allow model-provider HTTP requests to private, CGNAT, or similar ranges through the provider HTTP fetch guard. Custom/local provider base URLs already trust the exact configured origin, except metadata/link-local origins, which remain blocked without explicit opt-in. Set this to `false` to opt out of exact-origin trust. WebSocket uses the same `request` for headers/TLS but not that fetch SSRF gate. Default `false`.Interactive custom-provider onboarding infers image input for common vision model IDs such as GPT-4o, Claude, Gemini, Qwen-VL, LLaVA, Pixtral, InternVL, Mllama, MiniCPM-V, and GLM-4V, and skips the extra question for known text-only families. Unknown model IDs still prompt for image support. Non-interactive onboarding uses the same inference; pass --custom-image-input to force image-capable metadata or --custom-text-input to force text-only metadata.
Provider examples
```json5{ env: { CEREBRAS_API_KEY: "sk-..." }, agents: { defaults: { model: { primary: "cerebras/zai-glm-4.7", fallbacks: ["cerebras/gpt-oss-120b"], }, models: { "cerebras/zai-glm-4.7": { alias: "GLM 4.7 (Cerebras)" }, "cerebras/gpt-oss-120b": { alias: "GPT OSS 120B (Cerebras)" }, }, }, }, models: { mode: "merge", providers: { cerebras: { baseUrl: "https://api.cerebras.ai/v1", apiKey: "${CEREBRAS_API_KEY}", api: "openai-completions", models: [ { id: "zai-glm-4.7", name: "GLM 4.7 (Cerebras)" }, { id: "gpt-oss-120b", name: "GPT OSS 120B (Cerebras)" }, ], }, }, },}```
Use `cerebras/zai-glm-4.7` for Cerebras; `zai/glm-4.7` for Z.AI direct.Anthropic-compatible, built-in provider. Shortcut: `openclaw onboard --auth-choice kimi-code-api-key`.Set `MINIMAX_API_KEY`. Shortcuts: `openclaw onboard --auth-choice minimax-global-api` or `openclaw onboard --auth-choice minimax-cn-api`. The model catalog defaults to M2.7 only. On the Anthropic-compatible streaming path, OpenClaw disables MiniMax thinking by default unless you explicitly set `thinking` yourself. `/fast on` or `params.fastMode: true` rewrites `MiniMax-M2.7` to `MiniMax-M2.7-highspeed`.For the China endpoint: `baseUrl: "https://api.moonshot.cn/v1"` or `openclaw onboard --auth-choice moonshot-api-key-cn`.
Native Moonshot endpoints advertise streaming usage compatibility on the shared `openai-completions` transport, and OpenClaw keys that off endpoint capabilities rather than the built-in provider id alone.Set `OPENCODE_API_KEY` (or `OPENCODE_ZEN_API_KEY`). Use `opencode/...` refs for the Zen catalog or `opencode-go/...` refs for the Go catalog. Shortcut: `openclaw onboard --auth-choice opencode-zen` or `openclaw onboard --auth-choice opencode-go`.Base URL should omit `/v1` (Anthropic client appends it). Shortcut: `openclaw onboard --auth-choice synthetic-api-key`.Set `ZAI_API_KEY`. Model refs use the canonical `zai/*` provider ID. Shortcut: `openclaw onboard --auth-choice zai-api-key`.
- General endpoint: `https://api.z.ai/api/paas/v4`- Coding endpoint (default): `https://api.z.ai/api/coding/paas/v4`- For the general endpoint, define a custom provider with the base URL override.Related
- Configuration — agents
- Configuration — channels
- Configuration reference — other top-level keys
- Tools and plugins